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NOTES
SHAPING SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER LOUISIANA'S PUBLIC BID LAW
The Louisiana Division of Administration disqualified Haughton
Elevator Division, the lowest bidder on nine elevator maintenance
contracts, as not being a "responsible" bidder under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 38:2211 (the public bid law).' The Division of Ad-
ministration's conclusion was based upon Haughton's allegedly un-
satisfactory performance under an earlier elevator maintenance con-
tract with the state. Haughton sued to enjoin the letting of the con-
tracts to other bidders claiming that it was entitled to adequate
notice and a fair chance to disprove charges of irresponsibility prior
to the rejection of its bid. The trial court's dissolution of a tem-
porary restraining order and its denial of a preliminary injunction
were upheld by the court of appeal.2 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
in determining that Haughton was entitled to temporary injunctive
relief, reversed the lower courts' decisions and held that the lowest
responsible bidder has a right to receive the advertised contract if
any is let and such right is entitled to the protection of procedural
due process. Haughton Elevator Division v. State Division of Ad-
ministration, 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979).
The basic statutory law at issue in Haughton is contained in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 38:2211,1 which requires that all public
work exceeding a certain sum be advertised and let by contract to
the lowest responsible bidder. Louisiana jurisprudence has recog-
nized that the public bid law is a prohibitory law founded on public
1. LA. R.S. 38:2211 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 103) provided
in pertinent part:
All public work exceeding the sum of five thousand dollars including both labor
and materials to be done by the state of Louisiana, any public corporation or
political corporation or political subdivision of the state and all purchases of
materials or supplies exceeding the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars to
be paid out of public funds shall be advertised and let by contract to the lowest
responsible bidder who had bid according to the contract, plans and specifications
as advertised, and no such public work shall be done and no such purchase shall
be made except as provided in this Part.
Former Revised Statutes 38:2211 whs reenacted by the legislature in 1977 and
currently appears as Revised Statutes 38:2212. 1977 La. Acts, No. 103, amending LA.
R.S. 38:2211 (1950). A 1978 amendment raised the threshold amount to $10,000. 1978
La. Acts, No. 670, amending LA. R.S. 38:2212 (Supp. 1977).
2. Haughton Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Administration, 359 So. 2d 693 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1978), rev'd, 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979).
3. Although this statute was renumbered by the legislature in 1977, see note 1,
supra, the pre-1977 version was applicable in Haughton. Thus, subsequent references
will be to the section number of the statute prior to the 1977 reenactment.
1980]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
policy.' It was enacted to protect taxpaying citizens against con-
tracts of public officials entered into because of favoritism and
possibly involving exorbitant and extortionate prices.5 The public
bid law represents an attempt to strike a balance between two often
competing public interests, the interest in having the work com-
pleted economically and the interest in quality performance.' In
endeavoring to achieve this balance, the awarding authority is often
confronted with a dilemma: if the contract is not awarded to the
lowest bidder, the public's interest in having the project completed
with minimum expense is thwarted; if the contract is awarded to the
lowest bidder and he is irresponsible, the public's interest in a quality
job is frustrated.
Even after the bids have been received, the awarding authority
has no legal obligation to accept any bid; it may determine that no
contract will be let and reject all bids.7 But if the contract is awarded,
it must be to the "lowest responsible bidder"' who "bid according to
4. Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9, 43 So. 2d 18 (1949); Boxwell v. Depart-
ment of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So. 2d 627 (1943).
5. In Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So. 2d 627 (1943), the
court quoted the following passage from American Jurisprudence:
"These provisions exist to protect citizen taxpayers from unjust, ill-considered or
extortionate contracts, or those showing favoritism, and if the public body is suf-
fered to disregard them and the other party permitted to recover upon an implied
contract, such provisions can always be evaded and set at naught. To depart from
these principles would be to open the door to abuses and practices fraught with
danger to the welfare of the citizens and taxpayers of municipalities and political
subdivisions of the state."
Id. at 771, 14 So. 2d at 631, quoting 43 AM. JuR. Public Works and Contracts § 95 (1942).
6. See LA. R.S. 38:2211 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 103). The
public bid statute seeks to insure that the work is performed economically by requir-
ing the awarding authority to let the contract to the lowest bidder. The statute also at-
tempts to assure a quality performance by requiring that the award be made to a
"responsible" bidder.
7. LA. R.S. 38:2214 (Supp. 1977). Due to the right of the awarding authority to re-
ject all bids, the courts have been unwilling to require the acceptance of a bid. In D.J.
Talley & Son, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 303 So. 2d 195 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), the
court stated that "to require the governing authority to enter a contract simply
because it has advertised for bids would certainly destroy its ability to achieve a fair
price within the budgeted amount of that project." Id. at 197. The fifth circuit in Hous-
ing Authority of Opelousas, La. v. Pittman Construction Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.
1959), asserted that "a court should not compel a public body to make a discretionary
award to a bidder not chosen by that body." Id. at 704.
8. LA. R.S. 38:2211 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 103). In Pitt-
man the court characterized "responsibility" as more than a question of financial ability
to perform the work; it includes other considerations such as skill, integrity, judgment,
experience, reputation, previous conduct on contracts, and any other factors bearing
on a bidder's successful performance of his contract. 264 F.2d at 698.
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the contract, plans, and specifications as advertised."9 When the
awarding authority enters into a contract in violation of the public
bid law, an unsuccessful bidder may sue to set aside and enjoin the
award.'
The jurisprudence interpreting Louisiana's public bid law has
conferred certain pre-disqualification rights upon the lowest bidder.
In Housing Authority of Opelousas, La. v. Pittman Construction
Co.," the low bidder was not afforded an opportunity to be present
at a meeting at which evidence against it was to be considered. The
awarding authority did not inform Pittman of a subcontractor's af-
fidavit expressing an unwillingness to work for it or of hearsay
charges that it was irresponsible until after the contract was awarded
to the next lowest bidder.12 The court stated that before being dis-
qualified as irresponsible, "the lowest bidder has the right to be
heard and the Board has the duty to listen on the subject of respon-
sibility." 3 This "right" to a hearing prior to disqualification is not
expressly authorized by the public bid law;" rather, as the fifth cir-
cuit seemed to infer, it is impliedly afforded by the statute.'5
9. LA. R.S. 38:2211 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 103).
10. See Sternberg v. Board of Comm'rs, 159 La. 360, 105 So. 372 (1925); St. Lan-
dry Lumber Co. v. Mayor and Board of Alderman, 155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1924). In
Pittman the court declared in a footnote that "it is well established in Louisiana that
an unsuccessful bidder on a contract advertised by a public board to be let to the
lowest bidder or lowest responsible bidder may sue to set aside the award." 264 F.2d
at 696 n.7.
11. 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959).
12. As the court expressed it:
This case can be sliced down to the Board's deciding that the low bidder was not
a responsible bidder-without giving the low bidder a fair chance to disprove the
charges of irresponsibility. By any reasonable standards, such action offends one's
sense of fair play and is an arbitrary abuse of discretion inconsistent with the let-
ter and the spirit of the Louisiana Public Works Law.
Id at 703.
13. Id at 704. The First Circuit Court of Appeal in Haughton found that the Loui-
siana Supreme Court had recognized as early as 1924 that the lowest bidder should be
given an opportunity to respond to charges of irresponsibility before disqualification.
359 So. 2d at 695, citing St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Mayor and Board of Alderman, 155
La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1924). In St. Landry Lumber the court held that the lowest respon-
sible bidder had a cause of action when it was willing to give satisfactory security for
the performance of the work, it was experienced and qualified to do the work, and the
municipal authorities arbitrarily and without hearing or investigation rejected its bid
for a higher one.
14. For the pertinent part of the statute, see note 1, supra.
15. See note 12, supra, and accompanying text. It should be noted that this
"right" to a hearing has its foundation in the public bid law and not ip procedural due
process. In Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964), a government contrac-
tor was debarred from participating in certain contracts with the Commodity Credit
Corporation. The court of appeals held that, absent procedural regulations promul-
gated in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, § 3(a)(b), 5 U.S.C.
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Although the Pittman court based its decision on statutory in-
terpretation, a possible alternative ground is suggested by the con-
stitutional mandate of procedural due process,"6 which protects in-
dividuals from arbitrary deprivations by government of "life, liberty,
or property."'7 Traditionally, the contours of the due process clause
were molded by reliance on a right/privilege distinction, procedural
due process protection being triggered by governmental depriva-
tions of an individual's legal rights and property interests. 8
However, if the individual laid claim to no legal right, but rather to,
a mere gratuity19 or privilege afforded by the government, he would
not be heard to complain that procedural safeguards were not
respected prior to the termination of this largess.
In recent years the Supreme Court has forsaken this right/
privilege distinction" in favor of a considerable broadening of the
liberty and property interests protected by procedural due process."
In Goldberg v. Kelly,2 the Court recognized that it is often more
realistic to regard "entitlements" as property than as a gratuity.23
§ 1002(a)(b) (1976), and absent notice, hearing, and findings, the debarment was invalid.
The court refused to consider whether the debarment violated due process standards
since its interpretation of the Act made it unnecessary to reach any constitutional con-
tentions.
16. In recent years the United States Supreme Court has used procedural due
process in order to expand the hearing requirement into new areas of government ac-
tion. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975).
Judge Friendly states that since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), was decided in
1970, we have witnessed a greater expansion of procedural due process in the last five
years than in the entire period since ratification of the Constitution. Friendly, supra,
at 1273.
17. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
18. The traditional position was "that one who has no 'right' at stake should not
be entitled to a hearing," and that "in [the] absence of a 'right' one should not even be
entitled to judicial review of an administrative denial of the gratuity or privilege." K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.12 at 176 (3d ed. 1972). If the holder of a fran-
chise had a "right," he might be entitled to a hearing before the franchise could be
revoked; a "mere privilege" might be revoked without notice or hearing.
19. The gratuity theory was much like that applied to a privilege; the government
could withhold, grant, or revoke a gratuity at its pleasure. Reich, The New Property,
73 YALE L.J. 733, 740 (1964).
20. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Justice Stewart stated that
the Court had "fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of the due process rights." Id.
at 571.
21. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 514 (1978). See, e.g., Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's continued employment at state university
pursuant to "implied" tenure); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (conditional
freedom following parole); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits).
22. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
23. Id. at 262 n.8.
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Subsequently, in Board of Regents v. Roth," the Court acknowledged
as entitlements, and thus protected by procedural due process, in-
terests founded only on a state-fostered expectation derived from a
source independent of the Constitution, such as state law.25 These
new statutory entitlements depend on construction of the relevant
statutes and recognition of the understandings between government
and individuals.26
Once it is determined that the interest at stake is within the
fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property, the pro-
cedural requisites are determined by assessing and balancing the
particular interests involved. Although "a weighing process has long
been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in
particular situations by procedural due process,""7 the Court has
recently come to rely principally on a utilitarian interest-balancing
approach.2" The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,29 using this approach,
announced a general formula for the determination of what process
is due.8 0 The identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in-
terest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."
This balancing approach has resulted in varying procedures 2
24. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
25. Id. at 577. In Roth the Court stated that property interests are not created by
the Constitution; rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits. Id.
26. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 515.
27. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570. The Court adds that to determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the
"weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake. Id.
28. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 478 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]; L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 540. See generally Mashaw,
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CH. L. REV.
28 (1976).
29. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
30. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 540.
31. 424 U.S. at 335.
32. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young have identified seven different elements of the
adversary process which may be required as part of the "due process" which must be
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whereby some deprivations can only be accomplished with very
detailed hearings while others can be summarily carried out.3
In the instant case, Haughton Elevator Division was the lowest
bidder on numerous elevator maintenance contracts, but was dis-
qualified as not "responsible" based on its past performance under
an elevator maintenance contract with the state. Haughton sued to
enjoin the letting of the contracts to other bidders, contending that
it was not given adequate notice and a fair opportunity to disprove
charges of irresponsibility prior to the rejection of its bid. In revers-
ing the trial court and the court of appeal, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the public bid law creates a right in the lowest
responsible bidder to receive the advertised contract if any is let as
a consequence of the biddings and such right is entitled to the pro-
tection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
court also announced specific procedural safeguards which are re-
quired before a low bidder is disqualified as not responsible."'
afforded to an individual when the government deprives him of life, liberty, or prop-
erty. The essential elements are: (1) adequate notice of the charges or basis for govern-
ment action; (2) a neutral decision maker; (3) an opportunity to make an oral presenta-
tion to the decision maker; (4) an opportunity to present evidence or witnesses to the
decision maker; (5) a chance to confront and cross-examine witnesses or evidence to be
used against the individual; (6) the right to have an attorney present the individual's
case to the decision maker; (7) a decision based on the record with a statement of
reasons for the decision. J. NOWAK, supra note 28, at 499.
33. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 28, at 509. The Court in Goldberg re-
quired that a welfare beneficiary be granted a trial-type hearing before welfare
payments could be discontinued. The hearing was to include: (1) adequate notice, (2) an
opportunity for oral argument to the adjudicator, (3) a chance to present evidence in
his behalf, (4) an opportunity to confront any witness who is adverse to his claim, (5) an
opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses, (6) disclosure of all evidence against him,
(7) a right to have an attorney present his case, (8) a decision based solely on the
evidence produced at the hearing, (9) a statement by the decision maker of the reasons
for his determination and the evidence he relied on, and (10) the making of a decision
which is, in fact, unbiased and impartial. 397 U.S. at 267-70.
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the
Court found the interests involved to lie somewhere in the middle of the continuum of
interests. The Court in Bell invalidated a statute which suspended the license of
drivers involved in an accident unless the driver furnished security to satisfy a judg-
ment or gave proof of financial responsibility. Although the Court did not delineate all
of the rights involved, it found that a prior hearing was required with procedures
somewhat less than that required in Goldberg. In Goss the Court required that a stu-
dent be given oral or written notice of the charges and an opportunity to explain his
position to the school authorities prior to suspension. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the Court found less procedural
protection required. The Mathews Court held that termination of social security
disability benefits did not require a prior evidentiary hearing. The Court upheld the
discharge of a federal employee without a prior hearing in ArnetL See generally J.
NOWAK. supra note 28, at 511 (discussing the emerging concept that in some instances
due process is fulfilled by a "post deprivation" hearing or suit).
34. For the specific procedural safeguards required, see text at notes 46-49, infra.
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As a prerequisite to finding that procedural due process applied,
the court made a determination as to whether the deprivation was
one of liberty or property, 5 concluding that the public bid statute
provides a "statutory entitlement."36 The court stated that "La. R.S.
38:2211 creates a right in the lowest responsible bidder to receive
the advertised contract, if any is let as a consequence of the bid-
dings. 37 Where did this "right" originate? According to the court,
this claim of entitlement evolves from the "Louisiana jurisprudential
interpretations"38 of the public bid statute; but the court cited no
authority for its statement. Prior jurisprudence has recognized that
if a contract is awarded, it must be awarded to the lowest responsi-
ble bidder; 9 however, there are no prior cases which state that the
lowest responsible bidder has an entitlement to receive the contract.
Rather than rely on jurisprudential interpretations which did not ex-
ist, the court could have inferred from the language of the public bid
statute a state-fostered expectation of entitlement.
Once the court determined that a statutory entitlement was in-
volved, it focused its attention upon resolving the issue of what type
of hearing was required by a balancing of interests.0 The interests
to be balanced, concluded the court, "are the interest of a particular
bidder in receiving the contract versus the public interest in having
the contract awarded expeditiously to the bidder who can most
economically perform the work in a responsible manner."'" A third
consideration -the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the pro-
cedures used and the probable value of additional or substitute pro-
cedures-should always form a part of any determination of what
process is due."2 Although this consideration was not expressly rec-
ognized in Haughton, it is likely that the court was influenced by
the rather haphazard manner in which Haughton was determined to
be irresponsible, which manner created an unacceptable risk of an
erroneous determination by the Division of Administration.3
35. For a discussion of when due process requirements apply, see text at notes
17-26, supra.
36. For a discussion of statutory entitlements as property rights, see text at notes
21-26, supra.
37. 367 So. 2d at 1165. The court also stated that if "the awarding authority deter-
mines that no contract will be let, under the terms of the statute, the bidders have no
protected interest in the award of a contract that requires notice, hearing, and reasons
for rejection." Id. at 1165 n.3.
38. 1& at 1165.
39. See note 8, supra, and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of the balancing process, see text at notes 27-33, supra.
41. 367 So. 2d at 1166.
42. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For the United State Supreme
Court's formula for determining what process is due, see text at notes 29-31, supra.
43. Haughton's disqualification was based upon an inspection conducted for the
Department of Health and Human Resources by a consulting engineer. A represen-
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After reconciling the interests of the bidder and the public, the
court proceeded to outline specific procedural requirements which
must be met before a low bidder is disqualified as irresponsible. The
court concluded that the governing authority must, prior to award-
ing the contract, give the bidder formal notice in writing indicating
that the authority is contemplating disqualifying the bidder." The
bidder must be given an opportunity to respond to the charges in
writing and, whenever feasible, the bidder should have an opportunity
for an informal hearing.45 After the bidder has been provided this in-
formal hearing, but before the award of the contract, the bidder
must be given formal written notice by the authority that he has
been disqualified."6 The records of this disqualification proceeding
must be preserved in order to form the basis for any subsequent
judicial review.' 7
After concluding that Haughton was not afforded the procedural
due process required to protect its property rights, the court
observed that "the petition might be supplemented to claim
damages from the awarding authority, if it wrongfully awarded the
contract to another bidder, or even perhaps from a higher bidder
tative of Otis Elevator Company, a competing bidder, accompanied the consulting
engineer in order to assist in the investigation of possible irregularities in the service
provided by Haughton. There is no evidence to indicate that Haughton ever received a
copy of the consulting engineer's report from the Division of Administration; however,
Haughton did get notice of the report's unfavorable evaluation by pure happenstance
when an Otis employee who was on the inspection team gave a copy to the Director of
Traffic at Charity Hospital who in turn gave Haughton a copy of the report. Haughton
responded by sending a letter of rebuttal to the Director of Traffic at Charity, but
there is no evidence that this letter was ever forwarded to the Division of Administra-
tion, the agency which disqualified Haughton. There is also no indication in the record
that Haughton ever received any formal response regarding its letter. At a meeting
held by the Division of Administration to discuss awarding the contracts, Haughton
was disqualified on all nine of the contracts based on its poor service of the Charity
elevators. Although a representative of Haughton was present at the meeting, he had
no prior notice of the meeting or its purpose and no opportunity to rebut the allega-
tions against Haughton prior to the disqualification.
44. 367 So. 2d at 1166.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Compare the procedures required to disqualify a low bidder with those re-
quired in Goldberg to discontinue welfare benefits. See note 33, supra. The procedures
required in Haughton are somewhat less extensive than those required in Goldberg;
however, this should be anticipated since in Goldberg the welfare recipient is often
denied the means of obtaining a subsistence when payments are discontinued and,
therefore, has a much stronger interest than does a contractor who bids on a contract.
Compare the procedures required in Haughton with those required in Mathews and
Arnett. See note 33, supra. Haughton requires an informal hearing prior to the award
of the contract whereas in both Mathews and Arnett the Court concluded that no prior
hearing is required.
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who wrongfully received the contract." 8 The court indicated that
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1934 9 and 231550 would provide the
basis for such damages.
The court left unresolved an important issue concerning the
rights of a low bidder who is disqualified for not bidding "according
to the contract, plans, and specifications as advertised."'" Is a low
bidder who is disqualified for failure to submit a responsive bid en-
titled to the same specified procedural safeguards as a low bidder
who is disqualified as not responsible? Bidders relying on the protec-
tions of the Haughton decision may find that there is a loophole in
the application of the safeguards established by the court if the
specified procedural requirements are not so extended. Never-
theless, it is submitted that different procedures based on the
reason for disqualification may be consistent with the balancing ap-
proach enunciated in Mathews.2 Whereas the low bidder would
serve as a good source of information in a determination of whether
a bidder is irresponsible, its helpfulness would be minimal in deter-
mining whether the bid is responsive. All the information the author-
ity needs is contained in the bid and is preserved in a form suitable for
later judicial review.
The result reached by the court in Haughton was obtainable
under prior federal jurisprudence interpreting state law.53 Why,
48. 367 So. 2d at 1169. The court added in a footnote that the 1974 constitution
permits governmental entities to be sued and to be held liable for damages. Id at 1169
n.8, citing LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10. As to the liability of the higher bidder, the court
stated in another footnote that "it appears doubtful ... that a high bidder should be
held liable for damages, if the contract is improperly awarded to it by a governmental
agency (unless perhaps it participated in the commission of the wrongful act, La. Civ.
C. art. 2324)." 367 So. at 1169 n.9.
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934 provides in pertinent part: "Where the object of the
contract is anything but the payment of money, the damages due to the creditor for its
breach are the amount of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been
deprived."
50. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315 provides in pertinentpart: "Every act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it." 1
51. LA. R.S. 38:2211 (1950) (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 103). For the
pertinent part of the public bid statute, see note 1, supra A low bidder can be dis-
qualified for two reasons: (1) irresponsibility; and (2) failure to bid according to the con-
tract, plans, and specifications. However, the low bidder has a statutory entitlement
regardless of the reason for his disqualification.
52. See text at notes 29-31, supra.
53. See text at notes 11-15, supra. The court could have rested its decision on a
statutory ground as was done in Pittman. In that case, the fifth circuit had stated that
before the lowest bidder can be disqualified as irresponsible he has the right to be
heard and the awarding authority has the duty to listen on the subject of responsibil-
ity. 264 F.2d at 704.
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then, did the court choose to rest its decision upon constitutional
grounds? The court's preference is consistent with a larger move-
ment toward requiring government to operate more openly5 -open-
ness being a deterrent to arbitrary government action. Due process
provides the court with a flexible instrument by which it can shape
and mold procedural requirements to a greater extent than is possi-
ble by statutory interpretation of the public bid law.55 By enun-
ciating specific procedural safeguards, the court not only requires
the awarding agency to conduct its business in the "sunshine," but it
more rigidly defines the limits within which the agency's discretion
must be exercised. Additionally, the purpose of the public bid law is
promoted since the required procedure reduces the risk of an er-
roneous determination. 6 However, a constitutional approach is not
without negative aspects. Constitutional interpretation tends toward
judicial legislation and lessened legislative influence; whereas, an ap-
proach based upon the interpretation of state statutes allows for
legislative input reflective of the balance of interests involved in a
particular context. The latter approach acknowledges the legislature
as the principal source of positive law and is thus more consistent
with the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society.
Despite the tendency of the Haughton decision to reduce the
likelihood of arbitrary government action, several unfavorable
ramifications are forseeable. The bidding process will necessarily be
delayed to some extent as a result of the more extensive procedures
now required. It can also be anticipated that public entities will
54. Haughton may be viewed as part of an overall trend toward opening govern-
ment to the public's view and making it more accountable to the public. The notion of
government operating in an open manner is illustrated by the due process explosion
and the court's carrying the hearing requirement from one new area of government ac-
tion to another. See note 16, supra. It is also illustrated by Louisiana's Public Meeting
Law, LA. R.S. 42:4.1 to 12 (Supp. 1976 & 79), and Administrative Procedure Act, LA.
R.S. 49:951-68 (Supp. 1974).
55. For some examples of the flexibility provided by due process, see note 33,
supra When employing due process, the court is permitted to enunciate specific pro-
cedural requirements which it determines are necessary as a result of a balancing pro-
cess. These requirements may range anywhere from very detailed trial-like hearings to
no hearing at all. However, when the court bases procedural requirements upon
statutory interpretation, the court's latitude is restricted by the precise terms of the
relevant statute.
56. For a discussion of the purpose of the public bid law, see text at notes 4-6,
supra. The public is protected against contracts awarded on the basis of favoritism and
contracts involving exorbitant and extortionate prices whenever the awarding agency
is prevented from making an erroneous disqualification. Likewise, the balance between
the public's interest in having the work completed economically and the interest in
quality performance is achieved.
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become more hesitant to reject the lowest bid 7 due to the burden
of performing each of the specified procedures and the risk of ex-
posure to liability. 8
Traditionally, the role of property has been viewed as that of
protecting certain private rights in wealth, thus establishing a bound-
ary between public and private power.59 When a private individual
acts within this area defined as "property," he has a great deal of
freedom, and any interference by the government must be justified.
It is in this manner that "property performs the function of main-
taining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating
zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner.'"0
Modern society has witnessed a rapid expansion of the public sector
of the economy in which government has emerged as a major source
of wealth. The government's distribution of wealth is no longer in-
consequential, but constitutes a major source of employment, con-
tracts, and welfare benefits.' These valuables dispensed by the
government are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of
wealth. 2
It is only through added safeguards that individuals can be pro-
tected against the arbitrary withdrawal of these new forms of
wealth at the discretion of awarding authorities, examiners, boards
of control, or character committees. If independence, dignity, and
pluralism are to find any sanctuary, these new forms of 'wealth must
be recognized as property and protected as such. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has taken such a stand in favor of protecting in-
dividualism against the whim and caprice of government by shaping
specific procedural requirements for disqualification under the
public bid law.
Richard Zimmerman, Jr.
57. This may not necessarily hold true since the second lowest bidder can sue the
public entity for its failure to disqualify an irresponsible bidder.
58. Judge Friendly stated that the due process explosion has given rise to many
questions of major importance to our society. Friendly, supra note 16, at 1268. One of
the questions he asks may seem particularly appropriate after Haughton. "Should the
executive be placed in a position where it can take no action affecting a citizen without
a hearing?" Id.
59. Reich, supra note 19, at 771.
60. Id.
61. Charles Reich identifies eight forms of government-created wealth: (1) income
and benefits; (2) jobs; (3) occupational licenses; (4) franchises; (5) contracts; (6) subsidies;
(7) use of public resources; and (8) services. Id. at 734-37.
62. Id. at 733.
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